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Emergence of Equilibria from Individual Strategies
in Online Content Diffusion
Eitan Altman⋆, Francesco De Pellegrini⋄, Rachid El-Azouzi†, Daniele Miorandi⋄ and Tania Jimenez†
Abstract—Social scientists have observed that human behavior
in society can often be modeled as corresponding to a threshold
type policy. A new behavior would propagate by a procedure
in which an individual adopts the new behavior if the fraction
of his neighbors or friends having adopted the new behavior
exceeds some threshold. In this paper we study the question of
whether the emergence of threshold policies may be modeled
as a result of some rational process which would describe the
behavior of non-cooperative rational members of some social
network. We focus on situations in which individuals take the
decision whether to access or not some content, based on the
number of views that the content has. Our analysis aims at
understanding not only the behavior of individuals, but also
the way in which information about the quality of a given
content can be deduced from view counts when only part of the
viewers that access the content are informed about its quality.
In this paper we present a game formulation for the behavior of
individuals using a meanfield model: the number of individuals
is approximated by a continuum of atomless players and for
which the Wardrop equilibrium is the solution concept. We derive
conditions on the problem’s parameters that result indeed in the
emergence of threshold equilibria policies. But we also identify
some parameters in which other structures are obtained for the
equilibrium behavior of individuals.
Index Terms—User-generated content, Complex Systems,
Video popularity, Game theory, Wardrop equilibria
I. INTRODUCTION
Online media constitute currently the largest share of Inter-
net traffic. A large part of such traffic is generated by platforms
that deliver user-generated content (UGC). This includes,
among the other ones, YouTube and Vimeo for videos, Flickr
and Instagram for images and all social networking platforms.
Among such services, a prominent role is played by
YouTube. Founded in 2005 by Chad Hurley, Steve Chen and
Jawed Karim and acquired in 2006 by Google, YouTube scored
in 2011 more than 1 trillion views (or, alternatively, an average
of 140 video views for every person on Earth), with more than
3 billion hours of video watched every month and 72 hours
of video uploaded every minute by YouTube’s users1.
Of course, not all videos posted on YouTube are equal.
The key aspect is their “popularity”, broadly defined as the
number of views they score (also referred to as viewcount).
This is relevant from a twofold perspective. On the one hand,
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more popular content generates more traffic, so understanding
popularity has a direct impact on caching and replication
strategy that the provider should adopt. On the other one,
popularity has a direct economic impact. Indeed, popularity
or viewcount are often directly related to click-through rates
of linked advertisements, which constitute the basis of the
YouTube’s business model.
Recently, a number of researchers have analysed the evo-
lution of the popularity of online media content [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], with the aim of developing models for early-stage
prediction of future popularity [7].
Such studies have highlighted a number of phenomena that
are typical of UGC delivery. This includes the fact that a
significant share of content gets basically no views [6], as
well as the fact that popularity may see some bursts, when
content “goes viral” [4]. Also, in [7] the authors demonstrate
that after an initial phase, in which contents gain popularity
through advertisement and other marketing tools, the platform
mechanisms to induce users to access contents (re-ranking
mechanisms) are main drivers of popularity.
In this paper, we address such phenomena, by developing
a model, based on game theoretical concepts and tools, for
understanding how user’s behaviour drives the evolution of
popularity of a given content. The work is based on rational
decision-making assumptions, whereby the users have to de-
cide whether to see a given content or not. This configures as
a game, where users seek to maximize some expected utility
based on their “perception” of the quality of the content2 and
on viewcount. However, users suffer also a cost for accessing
contents of bad quality, i.e., waste of time and possibly
bandwidth, batteries, etc. In particular, in the decision process
the viewcount is used as a noisy estimator of the quality
of a content. Interestingly, this context resembles closely the
situation in the economic domain, where customers of a firm
which are uninformed do infer the quality of products from
the length of the queue they encounter upon requesting firm’s
goods to purchase [8].
Extensive advertising and marketing campaigns can be used
to push the viewcount of a given content up. And in the deci-
sion making process users do not know whether the viewcount
has been “pushed” by such means. Also, the decisions made
by different users influence the viewcount and consequently
the decisions made by other users, a process which suits well
the usage of game theoretical machinery.
Specifically, we describe the conditions for the adoption of
2This may come, e.g., from the name of user who posted the content.
common behaviors in online content access. This is inspired
by findings in social science [9], [10], [11]: results there show
that emerging behaviours would propagate by a procedure in
which an individual adopts a novel behavior if the fraction
of neighbors or friends having adopted the same behavior
exceeds some threshold. In our context, the threshold would
be expressed in terms of viewcount or related metric.
In the sense of game theory, users of online media repre-
sent non-cooperative rational players connected through some
social tie, e.g., being users of the same UGC platform. Since
we consider systems composed by a very large number of
users, the customary tool to study the user behaviour is that
of Wardrop equilibria [12]. In particular, we have found a
number of conditions for which such equilibria exist and can
be characterized analytically. Explicit conditions were found
for content to stay at zero views or to become so popular that
it is makes sense for all users to access it the sooner the better.
Furthermore, we identify, for the general case, conditions
under which players tend to accrue around a common strategy
depending on initial conditions. This is due to the existence of
a continuum of equilibria: the system will settle at any point
very much depending on initial conditions imposed, for in-
stance, by a set of forerunners which cause significant changes
of the content popularity. Such conditions were identified in
early works such as [13] in other contexts: there, the authors
applied threshold type Nash equilibrium strategies in which
one purchases priority if and only if upon arrival the queue size
is larger than some threshold value. Key motivation in [13] is
predictability and control of purchase priority. What motivates
this work is predictability and control of online content access.
Novel contribution: in this paper, we move away from the
classical analysis of social networks in the spirit of [7], [4],
[5], [1]: instead, we provide a first analysis based on games.
The aim of this paper is to provide a novel perspective where
contents compete to gain popularity and are subject to the
effect of user’s choice. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
this is the first attempt so far to describe content popularity in
UGC systems using game theoretical tools.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we introduce the system model and the notation
used throughout the paper. Results for the case when plain
viewcount is used to make decisions are presented in Sec. III.
When decisions account also for a large increasing trend of
content popularity, i.e., looking for ’hot’ content, the dynamics
of the game becomes different. This case is analysed in
Sec. IV. In Sec. V we analyze the joint effect when both
the viewcount and its trend are both relevant to the user.
Finally, in Sec. VI we model the effect of side information
when users have some measure of future content dynamics.
Sec. VII reviews the related work and Sec. VIII concludes the
paper highlighting directions for expanding the current reach
of the work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider contents made available to a user by means of
YouTube or a similar platform. We denote by τ the lifetime of
(a) “President Obama Sings Sweet Home Chicago”
(b) “Chris Sharma Worlds’ First 5.15”
(c) “Montersino’s Sacher Cake”
(d) “Shakira – Waka-Waka”
(e) “Bruno Mars – Grenade”
(f) “Adele – Rolling in the deep”
Fig. 1: Dynamics of the viewcount for six sample videos: the push
dynamics can be identified with the first part of the dynamics, where
labels identify some actions that are significant for the diffusion of
the video; observe for cases a, b and c how a linear dynamics takes
over in the last part of the dynamics. The labels tagging the first part
of the dynamics mention specific events that identify the diffusion of
the content on specific platforms or channels.
a content, i.e., the time horizon during which the content bears
some interest. In general, such horizon differs depending on
the type of content: it can be typically of the order of weeks
to months for YouTube videos or a few days for news [7]. A
possible extension to the case of variable time horizon is the
addressed in Sec. IV.
We denote by X(t) the viewcount attained by a given
content θ at time t seconds after it has been posted, for
0 ≤ t ≤ τ .
As in standard UGC platforms, there are two mechanisms
that coexist and can jointly increase the viewcount:
• push: the content provider exploits some preferential
channels (including paid advertisement either directly on
the UGC system or via social networking platforms) to
make users aware of the content and to induce them to
access it. We call push users the users that access the
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content as a reaction to the push mechanism.
• pull: users find about the content through standard search
and decide to access it based on the belief that the content
is relevant for them. We call users accessing a content
through the pull mechanism pull users.
In practice, many YouTube videos are subject to the push
and the pull mechanisms described above such as the examples
that we reported in Fig. 1. For instance, Fig. 1a, shows the
dynamics of a popular video with viewcount X ≥ 675000.
The YouTube statistics associated with the video describe
explicitly a series of events happening in the first part of the
dynamics of X . For instance, the event B that appears around
02/12/2012, is precisely the event ‘‘First embedded
on: plus.google.com’’ which indeed configures as a
push towards a social network platform. After the initial push,
such events vanish, and the rest of the dynamics appears
ascribed mostly to the pull mechanism defined above, with
a linear increase in the viewcount.
Also, some of the reported videos are representative of a
specific class of online contents, which are those we will be
dealing with in the rest of the paper. We can refer to those as
the contents that comply to the exponential-linear model, for
the sake of brevity. In particular, many such contents appear
to obey to the following dynamics: after an initial exponential
growth, the increase of the viewcount becomes linear. The way
to interpret such a behavior can be traced to the notion of push
and pull mechanisms described above: the exponential growth
corresponds to actions through which the source distributes
the content within a basin of target push viewers. When such
basin is finite and small with respect to the content diffusion
dynamics, the viewcount dynamics experiences a saturation
effect which takes over after an initial phase. However, at
that stage, the access to the content is due to pull users
that come across the content browsing online: they do so at
random from a very large basin, so that the access rate, i.e.,
the viewcount increase rate, is linear. These combined effects
are visible in the case of the first two videos, i.e. Fig 1a and
Fig 1b. In the case of the first video, the saturation effect is
well visible, whereas in the case of the second one the linear
increase following the saturation is dominating. The example
in Fig 1c is a case where all the dynamics is linear with
good approximation: as it will be clear in the following, in the
exponential-linear model this case is represented when either
the basin of push users is large or when the rate at which
contents are pushed is small.
Remark 1: Not all videos will diffuse according to the
proposed exponential-linear model. For instance, there exist
cases when the initial viewcount dynamics displays a charac-
teristic sigmoid shape. We reported in Fig 1d,e,f the viewcount
dynamics for three popular music videos: in those cases the
dynamics resembles the logistic curve associated to the spread
of epidemics. We can ascribe such similarity to the presence
of a positive feedback in the push mechanism, e.g., those who
access the content have some mean to recommend the content
for others to access it, through targeted recommendation or
similar mechanism. When a social network is present, this
X(t, θ)
tβ(θ) ττ − tβ(θ)
β
Fig. 2: The reward or the cost of content θ for a tagged user is
represented by the time during which the content can be accessed,
i.e., when viewcount is larger than threshold β.
may happen due to the push of the content into the neighbor-
hood of those who view the content. A similar and perhaps
more powerful feedback effect can happen between different
channels on the same platform, e.g., YouTube channels, and
across different platforms through the recommendation list that
is presented to the platform users.
This also qualifies the type of exponential-linear dynamics that
we consider as those for which this type of feedback does not
play a significant role. In particular, in the case of Fig 1a,
the content is of interest at the national scale in the US, and
the viewers are likely driven to the content by general search
criteria (e.g., typing in a search engine). Also, in the case
of Fig 1c, the viewers are likely those who browse for some
specific recipe, whereas in the case of Fig 1b viewers are
interested in a niche sport, where the event is known within
the reference community. In all such cases we see that the
linear part of the dynamics takes over and becomes dominant.
Game model
In our model, we are interested in the uptake of the pull
users. Pull users interested in the given content do not know in
advance its quality. They may discover it during interval [0, τ ]
at random. Their estimation of the interest/potential quality is
based on the viewcount X . In the simplest case, contents with
higher viewcount are more likely to be accessed.
We define by Xps(t) the number of push users accessing
the content up to time t as a reaction to the push mechanism
and, analogously, by Xpu(t) the number of those accessing it
through the pull mechanism. Clearly, X(t) = Xps(t)+Xpu(t).
Users have beliefs about the quality of the content. We
denote by piG the belief that a given content is good (i.e.,
of interest or anyway worth accessing) and, conversely, by
piB = 1 − piG the belief that the content is bad. We denote
by pi = (piG, piB) the corresponding distribution. Stating
piG = 0.75 means that a user believes that every 4 similar
contents she would get 3 good ones and 1 bad one.
The content access configures as a game where we define
players, strategies and utilities. Players: the players are pull
users: based on their belief pi, they may access the content θ
or not.
Strategies: they access θ when the viewcount is above a
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certain threshold, i.e., X(t) ≥ β ≥ 0.3 Hence, the strategy for
a certain user is the viewcount threshold β ≥ 0. Of course,
all other players also adopt their own strategy with respect to
θ and we denote α the vector of strategies of all remaining
users: α is a vector of viewcount thresholds for all other users.
Utilities: users face either a cost C or a reward R for playing
strategy β: the cost and the reward is the fraction of lifetime
when the content is in the viewcount range, i.e, when they are
willing to access it. The rationale to define this cost/reward is
the following. Let a good content be worth one unit reward,
and a bad content worth a unit cost. The user may hit several
similar contents at random over time. If they are good, the
fraction of those actually accessed will be proportional to 1−
tβ
τ
, where we define tβ = min{t |β = X(t)}, i.e., tβ is the
smallest instant when the threshold is achieved. That also is
going to be the long term reward, or the cost, for accessing
similar online contents. Formally,
R(α, β,G) = (τ − tβ(G))
+, C(α, β, B) = (τ − tβ(B))
+
Finally, based on their belief pi, players expect a utility when
playing β that amounts to
U(α, β) = piGR(α, β,G) − piBC(α, β, B)
According to the above expression, the cost and the reward
are a function of the interval when the content is above the
threshold, i.e., when the users can benefit from it, and depends
on the other players strategy. Furthermore, the action taken by
players depends on their belief on the quality of the content.
In the following we will investigate symmetric equilibria,
i.e., equilibria for which all users play α ≥ 0. We can hence
adopt a simplified scalar notation and define tα = min{t|α =
X(t)}.
Let a tagged user playing β when all the remaining users
use α: we make the assumption that Wardrop conditions holds.
Namely, for a large number of users any unilateral deviation
of a single user does not affect the utilities of other users.
I.e., deviations due to a single user action are negligible.
Wardrop equilibria are much easier to compute than the Nash
equilibrium; however, Wardrop is a good approximation for
the latter, as in [14].4.
The tagged user expects to gain a certain reward R(α, β,G),
for a good content and expects to suffer a cost C(α, β,B)
when the content is bad: under which conditions α is the
best response to itself, namely β∗(α)? We answer to this
question in the next sections under different knowledge of the
viewcount dynamics available to users.
Before we introduce our analysis, we recall that the utility
function has the following expression for β ≥ βτ,B
U(α, β) =
{
0 if β ≥ βτ,G
piG(τ − tβ(G)) if βτ,B ≤ β ≤ βτ,G
3We consider the reference case when players select based on the viewcount
only for the sake of explanation. We will extend the model to other interesting
cases in next sections.
4A traditional application of Wardrop equilibria is road traffic, where users
tend to settle to routes minimizing their delay: the effect of a route change
of an individual driver belonging to a flow is negligible system-wide to the
utilities of other users.
where βτ,θ is solution of the following equation
tβτ (θ) = τ (1)
We observe that the utility function U is nonincreasing for
β ≥ βτ,B. However the best response β∗(α) can be found only
in the interval [0, βτ,B]. As a result we restrict our analysis
to case when β ≤ βτ,B in which the utility function can be
expressed as
U(α, β) = piG(τ − tβ(G))− piB(τ − tβ(B))
III. PLAIN VIEWCOUNT
The basic model that we introduce in this section is based
on the assumption that pull users rely on the number of hits
of the contents to judge if it is worth to access it or not, i.e.,
they judge based on how many users accessed it. Thus, they
play based on the dynamics. We hence specialize our analysis
to two cases.
A. Linear case
First, we examine the case when the process of diffusion
of contents is linear. This is the case when the time scale of
the content diffusion is very large compared to the pool of
potential users. A mechanism that that is able generate such
a dynamics is the combined effect of an advertisement which
is broadcasted to a very large pool of viewers, e.g., covering
newspapers or other general audience media, and people so
made aware of the existence of the content who decide to
access the content with some random delay thereafter.
Thus, we let Xps(t, θ) = λpst·1(t) where 1(t) is the unitary
step function, and Xpu(t, θ) = λpu(t− tα) · 1(t− tα)5.
Observe that in this case λps = λps(θ), whereas λpu is
independent of θ. In fact, we assume pull users judge based
on viewcount only [8]. However, we assume that λps(G) ≥
λps(B).
Lemma 1: In the linear case, under the assumption
λpu(G) ≥ λpu(B), it holds
i. if piG
λps(G)
≥ piB
λps(B)
, then β∗(α) = 0.
ii. if piG
λps(G)
≤ piB
λps(B)
but piG
λps(G)+λpu
≥ piB
λps(B)+λpu
, then
β∗(α) = α
iii. if piG
λps(G)
≤ piB
λps(B)
but piG
λps(G)+λpu
< piB
λps(B)+λpu
, then
β∗(α) = βτ,B
Proof: We need to distinguish two cases, namely α ≥ β
and α ≤ β, determine the best response for each case, and
then by comparison choose the best response β∗ = β∗(α).
The expression for the utility in the two cases follows.
If α ≥ β, then X(t, θ) = Xps(t, θ) for 0 ≤ t ≤ tβ . Thus,
we can write simply
tα =
α
λps(θ)
, tβ =
β
λps(θ)
and the expression for the utility
U(α, β) = τ(piG − piB)− β
( piG
λps(G)
−
piB
λps(B)
)
(2)
5In a single source diffusion model, for instance, X = N(1−exp(−λt)) =
Nλt+ o(t)
4
If α ≤ β, then X(t, θ) = Xps(t, θ) for 0 ≤ t ≤ tα and
X(t, θ) = Xps(t, θ) +Xpu(t, θ) for tα ≤ t ≤ tβ . In this case,
tα =
α
λpu(θ)
, tβ =
β − α
λps(θ) + λpu
+ tα
and in turn
U(α, β) = τ(piG − piB)− α
( piG
λps(G)
−
piB
λps(B)
)
−(β − α)
( piG
λps(θ) + λpu
−
piB
λps(θ) + λpu
)
(3)
Now, we can distinguish the three statements in the claim:
i. piG
λps(G)
≥ piB
λps(B)
: in the first case, due to linearity, β = 0
maximizes the utility; in the second case, we observe that
indeed it must hold piG ≥ piB , and then
piGλps(B)− piBλps(G) ≥ 0 ≥ λpu(piB − piG)
so that piG
λps(G)+λpu
≥ piB
λps(B)+λpu
: in turn the utility function
is maximized again if β = 0. Hence, it holds β∗(α) = 0.
ii. In the first case, it is optimal to maximize β, which brings
β = α. In the second case, in turn it is optimal to minimize
β, so that again β = α. Hence, β∗(α) = α.
iii. In the first case, the best response is the same as in ii. In
the second case, instead, it is optimal to maximize β, so that
again β = βτ,B . However, the last term of (3) is positive and
β = βτ,B maximizes it. Also, by comparison with (2), indeed
β∗(α) = βτ,B in this case.
The above results provide a characterization of the possible
symmetric Wardrop equilibria of the system.
Theorem 1: i. if piG
λps(G)
≥ piB
λps(B)
, then 0 is a symmetric
Wardrop equilibrium
ii. if piG
λps(G)
≤ piB
λps(B)
but piG
λps(G)+λpu
≥ piB
λps(B)+λpu
,then
all 0 ≤ β ≤ βτ,B are symmetric Wardrop equilibria
iii. if piG
λps(G)
≤ piB
λps(B)
but piG
λps(G)+λpu
< piB
λps(B)+λpu
, then
βτ,B is a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium
It is possible to interpret the above result as follows: piG
λps(G)
represents the time pace at which push users are believed to
access a good content. Similarly piB
λps(B)
represents the time
pace at which push users are believed to access a bad content.
Thus, condition i. suggests that it is always convenient to
anticipate the access to the content. In case ii., the situation is
dictated by the uptake of pull users, because they increase the
viewcount thus reinforcing the believed viewcount pace of a
good content against that of a bad content. Finally, in case iii.
there is no incentive in accessing the content.
B. Exponential case: fixed time horizon
Let us consider the content dissemination process operated
by a content provider using a finite set of potential target
users. After the content is posted by the provider directly to
users, it will be transmitted to more and more users by using
some preferential channels. In this case, we need to model the
push dynamics accounting for the size N of the pool of push
users, i.e., we assume that the content provider disseminates
the content according to
X˙ps(t, θ) = λps(θ)(N −Xps(t, θ)),
so that
Xps(t, θ) = N(1− e
−λps(θ)t) for t ≥ 0 (4)
We reported in Fig. 3 the shape of the utility function under
the exponential case for a fixed time horizon. As it can be
observed in case a), for smaller values of α, i.e, α = 400 a
low value of the belief piG causes the access to be delayed till
time τ , whereas for increasing values of piG we observe first
a local maximum at α (pig = 0.75), and finally the strategy
β = 0 takes over corresponding to very large values of piG.
Indeed, such a behavior of the utility function resembles – for
a fixed N – what we observed in the linear case. However, at a
closer look, namely in Fig. 3c) we understand that the situation
is more elaborate: in particular, we know that number of push
users N impacts the speed at which the viewcount increases.
As such, a small N does not permit to pass the threshold α,
whereas a very large one incentivizes early access: recall that
βmax := βτ,B means access at time t = 0. In between, the
presence of a maximum predicts, as in the linear case, the
existence of best responses that lie in the interior of [0, βmax].
This intuitive numerical insight is confirmed by the theoretical
results that we detail in the following.
We distinguish two cases, namely α < β and β ≤ α.
If β ≤ α, we have
tβ(θ) = −
1
λps(θ)
log
(
1−
β
N
)
, tα(θ) = −
1
λps(θ)
log
(
1−
α
N
)
Hence the utility becomes
U(α, β) = (piG − piB)τ + log
(
1−
β
N
)( piG
λps(G)
−
piB
λps(B)
)
Let β∗1(α) (resp. β∗2 (α)) be the best response to α in [0, α]
(resp. [α, βmax])
Lemma 2: In the exponential case, under the assumption
λps(G) > λps(B), it holds for β ≤ α
• If piG
piB
<
λps(G)
λps(B)
then β∗1 (α) = α
• If piG
piB
>
λps(G)
λps(B)
then β∗1 (α) = 0
• If piG
piB
=
λps(G)
λps(B)
then for every β∗1 ∈ [0, α] is optimal
Proof: The proof is similar to the one developed in the
linear case for β ≤ α.
Now, we study the second case: α ≤ β. If tα ≤ t ≤ tβ ,
X(t, θ) = N(1− exp(−λps(θ)t) + λpu(t− tα) (5)
for which we obtain
tβ = λps(θ)
(
W
(λps(θ)
λpu
N
e
λps(θ)
λpu
N(1− β
N
)(
1− α
N
) )
− log
(eλps(θ)λpu N(1− βN )(
1− α
N
) )) (6)
where W (·) is the Lambert function [15]. We can obtain the
derivative of the above expression by letting ξ(β) = e
ζ(θ)(1−
β
N
)(
1− α
N
)
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Expo. push: λpu =1.5 N λps(G)
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α
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(a) Case α = 400
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0
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Expo. push: λpu =1.5 N λps(G)
β/β
max
piG = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
(b) Case α = 700
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0.2
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Expo. push: λpu =1.5 N λps(G)
β/β
max
N = 50000
N = 1000
N = 700
(c) α = 700, increasing N
Fig. 3: The utility function for N = 1000, for τ = 10 days, λps(G) = 10−1 views/day, λps(B) = λps(G)/10. a) α = 400 views, b) α = 700
views. Increasing values of the belief piG determine different shapes for the utility function. c) Increasing values of N = 700, 1000, 50000
for α = 700. All graphs for λpu = 1.5Nλps(G).
and ζ(θ) = λps(θ)
λpu
N
d
dβ
tβ =
1
λps(θ)
d
dβ
W (ζ(θ)ξ(β, θ)) − log(ξ(β))
=
1
λpu
·
1
1 +W (ζ(θ)ξ(β, θ))
After some cumbersome algebra, we derive
Lemma 3: In the exponential case, under the assumptions
λps(G) > λps(B) and λps(G)N ≤ λpu, for α ≤ β it holds
• If piG ≤ piB then β∗2(α) = βτ,B
• If 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≥
piG
piB
for all β ∈ [α, βτ,B] then
β∗2(α) = α
• If 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(βτ ,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(βtau,B)) ≤
piG
piB
for all β ∈ [α, βτ (B)] then
β∗2(α) = βτ,B
• otherwise β∗2(α) is the solution of the following equation
1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(β∗2 (α), G))
1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β∗2 (α), B))
=
piG
piB
Proof: The derivative of the utility function U is
U ′(α, β) =
1
λpu
( piB
W (ζ(G)ξ(β,B))
−
piB
W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G))
)
(7)
Since ξ(β,G) > ξ(β,B) and ζ(G) > ζ(B) then it is easy to
check under condition piG ≤ piB that U ′(α, β) > 0. Hence the
utility function attains a unique maximum at βτ,B.
In order to complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that
the function U is either non-increasing, or there is some β¯
such that U is non-decreasing for β < β¯ and non-increasing
for β > β¯.
Assume that there exists a β¯ such that U ′(α, β¯) ≤ 0. From
(7), it is sufficient to show that
U ′(α, β) ≤ 0 for all β > β¯
We can show the above propriety by letting W¯ (β) =
1+W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G))
1+W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B)) and it turns out that
∂W¯ (β)
∂β
=
1
(1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B)))2(ζ(B)W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B))(1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G)))
1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B))
−
ζ(G)W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G))(1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B)))
1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G))
)
To show ∂W¯ (β)
∂β
≤ 0, we impose the inequality
ζ(B)W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B))
(1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β,B)))2
≤
ζ(G)W (ζ(G)ξ(β,B))
(1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(β,G)))2
(8)
We can obtain the above inequality under assumption
λps(G)N ≤ λpu by letting
f(y) =
yW (y e
y(1−
β
N
)
(1− α
N
)
(1 +W (y e
y(1−
β
N
)
1− α
N
))2
Hence the derivative of f can be expressed as
∂f
∂y
= w(y¯)
w2(y¯) + w(y¯)(1 − y(1− β
N
)) + 2 + y(1− β
N
)
(1 + w(y¯)2
(9)
where y¯ = y e
y(1−
β
N
)
(1− α
N
) . In fact it can be showed that f˙ is positive
for y(1− β
N
) ≤ 1 i.e., λps(G)N ≤ λpu.
Overall, the above cases are summarized in the following
theorem
Theorem 2: Let λps(G) > λps(B) and λps(G)N ≤ λpu,
then in the exponential case
i) If piG ≤ piB then βτ,B is a symmetric Wardrop equilib-
rium
ii) If piG > piB then the following cases hold
a) If piG
piB
<
λps(G)
λps(B)
and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))
W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≥
piG
piB
for all
β ∈ [α, βτ,B] then all 0 < β ≤ βτ,B are symmetric
Wardrop equilibria
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b) If piG
piB
<
λps(G)
λps(B)
and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(βτ ,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(βτ ,B)) ≤
piG
piB
for
all β ∈ [α, βτ,B] then βτ,B is a symmetric Wardrop
equilibrium
c) If piG
piB
<
λps(G)
λps(B)
and there exists a β¯ is the solution
of the following equation
1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(β¯, G))
1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(β¯, B))
=
piG
piB
then β¯ is a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium
iii) If piG
piB
>
λps(G)
λps(B)
, then the following cases hold
a) if 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≥ piGpiB for all β ∈ [α, βτ,B] then
0 is a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium
b) if 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≤ piGpiB for all β ∈ [α, βτ,B], then
there exists a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium which
is given by

0 if τpiB < piGtβτ,B (G)
βτ,B if τpiB > piGtβτ,B (G)
β∗ ∈ {0, βτ,B} if τpiB = piGtβτ,B (G)
(10)
Theorem. 2 displays a structure of the best response that
is similar to the result obtained for the linear case, but we
should highlight some differences. First, the additional request
λps(G)N ≤ λpu is excluding the case when the effect of the
pull mechanism is negligible compared to push mechanism.
This means that we are restricting to the case when the
aggregated maximum rate at which the viewcount can increase
due to the push mechanism is smaller than the increase that
is generated once the viewcount is above threshold for pull
users. Indeed, this is the interesting case when the content
provider’s aim is to attract a large basin of pull users using a
target limited audience of push users.
Second, we observe that the term piθ
λps(θ)+λpu
that was
present in the linear case is now replaced by a term involving
the Lambert function W (·) [15]: this is due to the combined
effect of the exponential growth and the linear growth above
the threshold, accounting for the saturation of the basin of
push users. In the case when N is very large or λps is very
small, the term collapses to the condition expressed in the
linear case.
IV. VARIABLE TIME HORIZON
In this section, we are interested in the case where the time
horizon during which the content is accessed by pull users is
not fixed. But, it is determined by the popularity of the content
and by the quality perceived by users. In particular, when the
popularity of a content is subject to saturation, we can model a
vanishing X˙ to encode the condition when a content which is
present online for a long time becomes stale. Conversely, fresh
uptaking contents will experience large values of X˙ and will
be preferred. This case fits well specific types of contents such
as news or pop songs, for which the trend of the viewcount
increase may be the main trigger for the users’ interest in some
content. Pull users still adopt a threshold strategy and browse
the content if
X˙(t, θ) ≥ γth (11)
Let us consider the exponential push case introduced in the
previous section. Condition (11) determines a variable horizon
to access content θ:
τ(α, θ) = X˙−1(γth)
Because the time horizon τ = ∞ for γth ≤ λpu, we restrict
our analysis to the case when γth > λpu.
Again, we are interested to compute the utility function
for a tagged user given a certain common threshold strategy
α played by other users; the objective is to compute the
best response β for the tagged user as done before. Let
Xth(θ) = N −
γth
λps(θ)
, τ0(θ) =
1
λps(θ)
log
(λps(θ)N
γth
)
and
τ1(θ) =
1
λps(θ)
log
( λps(θ)N
γth−λpu
)
.
Observe that the interval of time when pull users will access
the content becomes now [τ0(θ) τ1(θ)]: the duration of such
interval corresponds to the useful lifetime of the content as
dictated by the interest of the users based on (11) and by the
content type.
We distinguish again two intervals, namely 0 ≤ β ≤ α and
α ≤ β ≤ τ , and denote β∗1 and β∗2 the best response in those
intervals, respectively. However, we need to account also for
(11) and to detail the utility accordingly.
It follows that if β ≥ α, then
U(α, β) = piG
(
τ1(G) − tβ(G)
)+
− piB
(
τ1(B)− tβ(B)
)+
If α > Xth(G) and β ≤ α
U(α, β) = piG
(
τ0(G)− tβ(G)
)+
+ piG
(
τ1(G)− tα(G)
)+
−piB
(
τ0(B)− tβ(B)
)+
− piB
(
τ1(B)− tα(B)
)+
If Xth(B) ≤ α ≤ Xth(G) and β ≤ α, then
U(α, β) = piG
(
τ1(G)− tβ(G)
)
−piB
(
τ0(B)− tβ(B)
)+
− piB
(
τ1(B)− tα(B)
)+
If Xth(B) ≥ α and β ≤ α, then
U(α, β) = piG
(
τ1(G)− tβ(G)
)
− piB
(
τ1(B)− tα(B)
)
With a similar analysis as that employed in the proof of
Thm.3, we can write:
Theorem 3: In the exponential case, under the assumptions
λps(G) > λps(B) and λps(G)N ≤ λpu, it holds
• If piG ≤ piB then β is a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium
where β = βτ (B) is solution of tβ(B) = τ
• If piG > piB , piGpiB <
λps(G)
λps(B)
and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≥
piG
piB
for all β ∈ [α, βτ0,B ] then all values in the interval [0, β˜]
are symmetric Wardrop equilibria.
• If piG > piB , piGpiB <
λps(G)
λps(B)
and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(βτ ,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(βτ ,B)) ≤
piG
piB
for all β ∈ [α, βτ0,B (B)] then β˜ is a symmetric Wardrop
equilibrium.
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Fig. 4: The utility function for N = 1000, for τ = 10 days, λps(G) = 10−1 views/day, λps(B) = λps(G)/10. a) Detail of the discontinuities
of U(α, β) for γ = 0.01, 0.1, 1, where α = 0.18 b) Extremal type of best response for α = 0.029, γ = 1.5 and under increasing values of
the belief piG. c) Same as b) but for γ = 0.3. Discontinuity in α corresponds to local maxima for piG = 0.25, 0.50.
• If piG > piB , piGpiB <
λps(G)
λps(B)
and there exists βs solution
of the following equation
1 +W (ζ(G)ξ(βs, G))
1 +W (ζ(B)ξ(βs, B))
=
piG
piB
then βs is a symmetric Wardrop equilibria.
• If piG
piB
>
λps(G)
λps(B)
and and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≥
piG
piB
for all
β ∈ [α, βτ0,B ] then 0 is a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium.
• If piG
piB
>
λps(G)
λps(B)
and and 1+W (ζ(G)ξ(α,G))1+W (ζ(B)ξ(α,B)) ≤
piG
piB
for all
β ∈ [α, βτ0,B ] then there exists a symmetric Wardrop
equilibrium which is given by

0 if τpiB < piGtβτ0,B
βτ (B) if τpiB > piGtβτ0,B
β∗ ∈ {0, βτ0(B)} if τpiB = piGtβτ0,B
(12)
The overall result in Thm.3 shows a structure that is close
to that obtained in Thm. 2. We can conclude that the presence
of a selective preference expressed in terms of the viewcount
trend does not affect the structure of the Wardrop equilibria.
In fact, they are of the kind determined before in the case of
a fixed length interval: either extremal ones or a continuum of
such restpoints. It is interesting to notice that this is following
irrespective of the fact that the utility function is linear as a
function of the ”viewing time”, i.e., the time that is useful for
the viewers, but, pull users’ preferences depend on a non-linear
function of the threshold type.
V. COMBINED EFFECT OF TREND AND VIEWCOUNT
In general, contents that are present online since a long
time display different popularity than contents which last only
a short time [7]. As we noticed in the previous section,
when popularity saturation occurs, X˙ vanishes for large t.
If users choose among contents with different trend and
different viewcount, they would naturally choose a content
with large viewcount and large increasing trend. To this respect
y(t) = X˙(t)X(t) encodes the condition when the pull user
still values the viewcount, but, she favors a large increasing
trend given two contents with the same viewcount.
Symmetric equilibria can be determined when in the system
all users adopt a strategy
α := y(tα), 0 ≤ tα ≤ τ
and again we determine the best response for a user deviating
using β := y(tβ) as a reply, where 0 ≤ tβ ≤ τ .
It is easy to see that in the linear case, the model developed
in the previous section applies as long as one replaces the
dynamics with the one below
Xps(t, θ) = λ
2
ps(θ)t+λps(θ), Xpu = λ
2
pu(t− tα) ·1(t− tα)
so that all the results can be specialized accordingly replacing
λps and λpu with λ2ps and λ2pu wherever they appear. The
intuition is that when the regime of content diffusion is linear,
i.e., when a large number of push users exists, the trend
of popularity has the only effect to reinforce the inequality
λps(B) 6= λps(G). We then move to a more interesting case.
A. Exponential push case
In the exponential case, the dynamics again is the same
captured by (4), (5). We can specialize the analysis to the two
cases as done before. If α ≥ β, y(tβ) = β implies that
β = λps(θ)N
2(1 − e−λps(θ)tβ )e−λps(θ)tβ
where the solution is such that tβ = − 1λ(θ)f(β, θ) where we
let f(β, θ) := log
(
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4β
λps(θ)N2
))
.
U(α, β) = (piG−piB)τ+
( piG
λps(G)
f(β,G)−
piB
λps(B)
f(β,B)
)
After observing that f(0, θ) = 0 and f(β,G) ≤ f(β,B) ≤ 0,
again we obtain two extremal cases: when piG
λps(G)
≥ piB
λps(B)
then U(α, β) − (piG − piB)τ ≤ 0 so that β = 0 maximizes
the utility. In the opposite case, namely, piG
λps(G)
≤ piB
λps(B)
,
U(α, β)− (piG − piB)τ ≥ 0, so that β = α does.
If α ≤ β, the condition for
β = X(t)
(
λps(θ)Ne
−λps(θ) + λpu
)
gives: tβ = tα(θ)−
N
λpu
[
1−
W (f(β,B)ξ(B)e−ξ(B))
ξ(B)e−2ξ(B)
]
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Fig. 5: The shape of function β1(λpu) for increasing values of λpu:
the vertical asymptote corresponds to the value λspu.
where we used the definition of WeW = x and we stressed
the dependence of tα on θ. It is important to notice that in this
case, tβ is not continuous, so that in correspondence of tα(G)
and tα(B) the utility function has possibly two discontinuities.
We reported in Fig. 4(a) the shape of the utility function for
increasing values of γ = 0.01, 0.1, 1 λpu = γNλps(G). For
larger values of γ the effect of discontinuities becomes negli-
gible with respect to the shape of the utility function (indeed
we are looking for the best response, i.e., the maximum of
U(α, β)).
In particular, we observe in Fig. 4(b) that for the choice of
parameters there, i.e., γ = 1.5, the shape of the utility function
leads again to the customary extremal type of best response
that we observed in the linear case. That is, access at time
t = 0, i.e., β = βmax for large piG and access at time tβ = τ ,
i.e., β = 0 for smaller values of piG. However, for γ = 0.3,
see Fig. 4(c), we find Wardrop equilibria (β∗(α) = α) in the
interior of [0, βmax]. Further numerical exploration confirmed
that the equilibria form an interval. Thus, again, we find that
there exist conditions (in this case, smaller λpu) when the
system has a continuum of equilibria as in previous cases.
VI. USERS WITH SIDE INFORMATION
In the previous section we have considered the product of
the trend and magnitude of the viewcount as a metric: as
seen there, the structure of the equilibria that we can expect
resembles closely what we found in the previous cases: either
extremal Wardrop equilibria or a continuum of restpoints. We
want to describe the case when potential viewers may be
provided additional information on the upcoming popularity
of a certain content, e.g., relying on some predictors or some
apriori information they have. They judge whether to access
or not a given content based on the product of the popularity
X and the popularity trend X˙ . But, they only know how such
metric is going to accumulate over time, i.e., the metric for a
user that approaches the content at time t is
y(t) =
∫ τ
t
X(u)X˙(u)du =
1
2
(X2(τ) −X2(t))
This metric can be used as a simple benchmark case: it
contains information on the future dynamics of X(θ), and it is
defined by the current and the final values of the viewcount.
However, the amount of such information in general is not
sufficient at time t to state the type of the content. Of course,
more sophisticated metrics are possible. Nevertheless, the one
at hand will do for the purpose of showing that by making the
potential viewers of a content aware of some side information,
the system may experience a deep change in the structure of
the equilibria.
Let all users adopt strategy
α := y(tα), 0 ≤ tα ≤ τ
and in the same way as done before we want to determine the
best response for a user adopting β := y(tβ) as a reply, where
0 ≤ tβ ≤ τ .
In the case β ≥ α, we recall that the dynamics is
X(t, θ) = α+ λ(θ)(t − tα)
where λ(θ) := (λpu+λps(θ)) for the sake of notation, so that
α+ λ(θ)(tβ − tα) =
√
X2(τ, θ)− 2β
which solves for tβ =
1
λ(θ)
(
α
λpu
λps(θ)
+
√
X2(τ, θ) − 2β
)
.
The corresponding expression for the utility is U(α, β) =
U0(α, β)−
[
piG
√
X2(τ,G)− 2β
λ(G)
−
piB
√
(X2(τ, B) − 2β)
λ(B)
]
where the term U0(α, β) = (piG−piB)τ−αλpu
(
piG
λps(G)λ(G)
−
piB
λps(B)λ(B)
)
and it turns out that
dU(α, β)
dβ
=
piG
λ(G)(X2(τ,G)− 2β)
1
2
−
piB
λ(B)(X2(τ, B)− 2β)
1
2
which is decreasing with β ∈ [−∞, βτ,B], where βτ,B :=
1
2X(τ, B) as follows by comparing the ratio of the two positive
terms appearing in the expression above under the assumption
X(τ,G) ≥ X(τ, B)). When piG
λ(G) 6=
piB
λ(B) the U(·, β) over R
attains a unique maximum at
β1 =
1
2
−X2(τ,G)
(
piB
λ(B)
)2
+X2(τ, B)
(
piG
λ(G)
)2
(
piG
λ(G)
)2
−
(
piB
λ(B)
)2
so that there exists also one maximum of U(α, β) in [tα, τ ].
We can distinguish three cases based on the fact that
1) β1 ≤ α: the best response in this case is β∗(α) = α
2) α < β1 < βτ,B: the best response is β∗(α) = β1
3) β1 ≥ βτ,B: the best response in this case is β∗(α) =
βτ,B.
Finally, we notice that when piG
λ(G) =
piB
λ(B) , case 1) applies.
In the case β < α, we can derive a similar analysis starting
from the dynamics X(t, θ) = λps(θ)t, so that
β = y(tβ) =
1
2
(
X2(τ, θ)− λ2ps(θ)t
2
β
)
so that tβ =
√
X2(τ, θ) − 2β, and
U(α, β) = (piG − piB)τ
−
[
piG
√
X2(τ,G) − 2β
λps(G)
−
piB
√
(X2(τ, B)− 2β)
λps(B)
]
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In turn, we can recognize the same structure for the best
response as in the previous case, where the maximum of
U(·, β) (when piG
λps(G)
6= piB
λps(B)
), over R is attained at
β2 =
1
2
−X2(τ,G)
(
piB
λps(B)
)2
+X2(τ, B)
(
piG
λps(G)
)2
(
piG
λps(G)
)2
−
(
piB
λps(B)
)2
and the three cases write
1) β2 ≤ 0: the best response in this case is β∗(α) = 0.
2) 0 < β2 < α: the best response is β∗(α) = β2.
3) β2 ≥ α: the best response is β∗(α) = α.
Again, when piG
λps(G)
= piB
λps(B)
, case 1) applies.
Now, to complete our analysis, we need to determine the
best response between the two cases: we need to detail the
relation between β1 and β2. To so do we can rewrite for the
sake of convenience
β1(x) =
1
2
pi2Gx
2X2(τ, B)− pi2B(L + x)
2X2(τ,G)
pi2Bx
2 − pi2G(L+ x)
2
where L = λps(G) − λps(B) and x = λps(G) + λpu. It can
be easily showed that
d
dx
β1(x) = pi
2
Gpi
2
B
2Lx(X2(τ,G)−X2(τ, B))(x − L)
(pi2Bx
2 − piG(L + x)2)2
which brings d
dx
β1(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0, with a singularity in
λspu =
piB
piG − piB
(λps(G)− λps(B)) − λps(B)
The typical shape of β1 is reported in Fig. 5. We observe that
β1(λpu = 0) = β2. The asymptotic value for λpu = ∞ is
β1(∞) =
1
2
pi2GX
2(τ, B)− pi2BX
2(τ,G)
pi2G − pi
2
B
It can be verified that β1(λpu) is injective. Hence, the above
analysis let us state: β1(∞) ≤ β1(0) = β2, which in turn leads
to the following
Lemma 4: For 0 ≤ λpu < λspu, it holds β1 ≥ β2, and for
λpu > λ
s
pu it holds β1 < β2.
Now we can combine the conditions above to derive:
Theorem 4: Let I = [0, βτ,B]
i. If λpu > λspu, then
Ws = [β1, β2] ∩ I
is the set of symmetric Wardrop equilibria for the system.
ii. If λpu < λspu then Ws ⊆ {0, βτ,B}.
Proof: Case i. follows immediately observing that for
β1 ≤ α the best response is β∗(α) = α and for β2 ≥ α
the best response is β∗(α) = α: both conditions are satisfied
simultaneously for α ≥ 0 if and only if α ∈Ws.
Case ii. is proved observing that the conditions for case i fail,
so that only extremal cases can hold. In particular, Ws is not
always the empty set: if β2 ≥ 0, then β1 ≤ 0 so that β∗(0) = 0
and the same holds in the opposite case, i.e., if β1 ≥ α = βτ,B
then β1 ≥ α = βτ,B so that β∗(βτ,B) = βτ,B .
The result in Thm. 4 let us observe a neat phase transition
effect on λpu: when the intensity of the views due to the pull
mechanism is below threshold λspu, only extremal Wardrop
equilibria are possible. Above that threshold, there can exist
a continuum of equilibria where the system can settle. Let
µ(·) denote the standard real measure: a sufficient condition
is provided in the following
Corollary 1: µ(Ws) > 0 if λpu > λspu and β2 ≥ 0 > β1.
We can observe that piG < piB implies β2 ≥ 0 and λpu > 0 >
λspu, so that a stronger sufficient condition than the one just
provided in turn becomes: piG < piB and β1 ≤ βτ,B .
VII. RELATED WORKS
The analysis of dynamics of popularity of online contents
has been subject of recent papers. The work [3] provides an
analysis of the YouTube system, with comprehensive view of
the characteristic of the generated traffic.
In [5] the authors address the relation between metrics
used to evaluate popularity. They observed that viewcount is
strongly correlated with several such metrics as number of
comments, ratings, or favorites. However, all such metrics do
not correlate to average rating. In this paper we confine our
analysis to viewcount as the metric of interest. [7] focuses
on the core problem of predicting popularity, namely, the
viewcount, based on early measurements of user access. Based
on YouTube videos or Digg stories measurements, the authors
observe that contents increasing fast their viewcount in early
stages typically become popular later on. The proposed em-
pirical model, i.e., logN(tr) = logN(to) + λ0(tr, t0) where
λ0(tr, t0), is a random multiplicative noise and N(tr), N(t0)
is the viewcount at tr and t0; it resembles closely the expo-
nential model adopted in this work.
In [4] the authors propose a model accounting for change of
ranking induced by UGC online platforms. The model is meant
to overcome the limitations of the preferential attachment
models. Those models in fact cannot explain bursty growth
of content popularity; those in turn are claimed an inherent
property of the online platforms. The authors relate bursty
growth spikes to the way such systems expose popular contents
to users and perform re-ranking of existing contents causing
positive feedback loops.
The paper [6] provides analysis of power law behavior
for the rank distribution of contents; the distribution of most
watched videos is found heavily skewed towards the most
popular ones.
Threshold models similar to those studied in this work
are described by Granovetter [11] in social science. The
assumption is that individuals make binary decisions (in our
framework, view or not view a content), according to some
static internal threshold of others participating. A generaliza-
tion based on threshold distribution is addressed in [9].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we characterized the access to online contents
by game theoretical means by leveraging on the concept of
Wardrop equilibrium. We deduced the structure of equilibria
in systems where users adopt threshold type policies to select
online contents. We explored several cases: the case when the
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plain viewcount is the metric, or the viewcount trend, or both
are combined as a product metric. We explored the case of
a fixed time horizon dictated by the content lifetime, and we
considered a case when the time horizon is not fixed. Finally
we explored the impact of side information available to users.
In all such cases we deduced the presence of a continuum of
equilibria, which has potential implications in the design and
control of platforms for online content access. In future work,
in particular, we are exploring the dynamics associated to such
sets of interior restpoints, when they exist, and comparing
those with typical dynamics of online contents. However,
not only equilibria are relevant: as showed in [10], threshold
strategies, under specific conditions, may well lead the system
to be asymptotically unstable; system trajectories may in turn
consist of cycles that can move into a chaotic dynamics,
essentially indistinguishable from random noise.
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